Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans by De Pirro, Silvana et al.
Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
De Pirro, Silvana, Lush, Peter, Parkinson, Jim, Duka, Theodora, Critchley, Hugo D and Badiani, 
Aldo (2019) Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans. Addiction Biology. ISSN 
1355-6215 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/83818/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
1 
 
Title: Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans 
 
Running Title: Alcohol and agency 
 
Silvana De Pirro1,2, Peter Lush1,2,3, Jim Parkinson3, Theodora Duka1,2, Hugo D. Critchley1,2,3, 
Aldo Badiani1,2,4 
 
1Sussex Addiction Research and Intervention Centre (SARIC), School of Psychology, 
University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; 2Sussex Neuroscience, University of 
Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; 3Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of 
Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; 4Department of Physiology and Pharmacology, Sapienza 
University of Rome, Rome, Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
*Correspondence should be addressed to: 
Aldo Badiani, 
SARIC, School of Psychology, and Sussex Neuroscience,  
University of Sussex, Falmer,  
BN1 9QH Brighton, United Kingdom.  
Email: Aldo.Badiani@sussex.ac.uk 
Phone: +44 (0)7447 528760 
 
or 
 
Silvana De Pirro 
SARIC, School of Psychology, and Sussex Neuroscience,  
University of Sussex, Falmer,  
BN1 9QH, United Kingdom,  
Email: S.DePirro@sussex.ac.uk 
Phone: +44 (0)7463 798574 
2 
 
Abstract 
Even at low to moderate doses, ingestion of the widely-used recreational drug alcohol 
(ethanol) can impact cognitive and emotional processing.  Recent studies show that the Sense 
of Agency (SoA; i.e. the subjective experience of voluntary control over actions) can be 
modulated by specific pharmacological manipulations.  The SoA, as quantified by the 
Intentional Binding (IB) paradigm, is enhanced by direct or indirect dopaminergic agonists in 
patients with Parkinson’s Disease and by ketamine (an NMDA receptor antagonist) in healthy 
individuals.  These findings implicate dopaminergic and glutamatergic neurotransmission in 
mechanisms underlying SoA.  Alcohol has a complex set of actions, including disinhibition 
of dopaminergic neurotransmission and allosteric antagonism at NMDA receptors.  Here, we 
tested the hypothesis that low to moderate doses of alcohol would enhance SoA, and impact 
impulsivity and subjective emotional state. 
We conducted two experiments in 59 healthy male and female social drinkers, who 
ingested either a placebo ‘vehicle’, or one of two doses of ethanol: 0.4 and 0.6 g/kg.  In both 
experiments we observed increased SoA/IB at both doses of alcohol exposure, relative to the 
placebo condition.  We found no correlation between the effects of alcohol on IB and on 
impulsivity or subjective emotional state. 
Our findings might have implications for social and legal responsibility related to 
alcohol use, particularly in states prior to overt intoxication.  Further studies are necessary to 
investigate the effects of alcohol and other addictive substances on the SoA. 
 
Keywords: ethanol, alcohol, affect, impulsivity, intoxication, sense of agency 
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Introduction 
The cognitive and physiological effects of alcohol (ethanol) are both time- and dose-
dependent (Hendler, Ramchandani, Gilman & Hommer 2011).  Research has mostly focused 
on the loss of inhibitory control produced by alcohol intoxication (Loeber & Duka 2009a; 
Field, Wiers, Christiansen, Fillmore & Verster 2010; Potenza & de Wit 2010), characterized 
by increased impulsivity, aggressivity, and risky behaviour (Rose & Duka 2007; de Wit 
2009; Field et al. 2010; Potenza & de Wit 2010; Nutt, King, Phillips & Independent 
Scientific Committee on Drugs 2010; McMurran 2012; Nikolaou, Field, Critchley & Duka 
2013; Miczek, DeBold, Hwa, Newman & de Almeida 2015; Berry & Johnson 2017).  The 
effects of low to moderate doses of alcohol, i.e. levels that are commonly consumed during 
social drinking, have received less attention (Cui & Koob 2017).  At these doses, alcohol can 
produce a pleasant state of euphoria, stimulation, disinhibition, loss of social anxiety, and 
relaxation, yet can also have a negative impact on cognition and emotional processing 
(Breitmeier, Seeland-Schulze, Hecker & Schneider 2007; Bisby, Leitz, Morgan & Curran 
2010; Dry, Burns, Nettelbeck, Farquharson & White 2012; Kamboj, Joye, Bisby, Das, Platt & 
Curran 2013).  These effects forewarn potential societal consequences even following 
consumption of moderate-to-low doses (Dimock 2011; Husak 2012; Cui & Koob 2017; Law 
& Sociology 2018).  In this context, it would be important to investigate directly the effects 
of alcohol on an implicit measure of the Sense of Agency (SoA).   
The SoA refers to the subjective experience of voluntary control over one’s own 
actions, and thus, the sense of ownership of the effects of these actions on the external 
environment (Moore & Obhi 2012; Wolpe & Rowe 2014; Haggard 2017).  Explicit 
quantitative measures as proxy of the SoA, are affected by a number of biases (Ebert & 
Wegner 2010).  Thus, in the last two decades, neuroscientists have focused on implicit 
procedures (for reviews see (Moore & Obhi 2012; Wolpe & Rowe 2014; Haggard 2017).  In 
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particular, the Intentional Binding (IB) paradigm, which evolved from Libet’s experiments on 
the neurophysiological basis of human volition (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl 1983), is a 
chronometric quantitative approach to investigate the association between one’s voluntary 
action and an external sensory effect (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras 2002).  In healthy 
humans, a voluntary action followed by presentation of an external stimulus evokes a 
systematic subjective distortion of time-perception when linked to a voluntary action.  By 
using a ‘Libet’s clock’ participants report the time of either a voluntary action (e.g. pressing a 
button) or of a sensory event (e.g. hearing a tone).  When the voluntary action and the sensory 
event are predictably coupled, humans tend to judge their action as occurring later in time and 
the sensory event as occurring earlier in time, relative to when both events occur separately.  
This biased perception of time indicates the ‘intentional binding’ of the voluntary action and 
sensory percept, an effect that is not produced for involuntary actions evoked by TMS or 
reflex (Haggard et al. 2002; see also Buehner 2015).   
Abnormalities of the SoA have been observed in several neurological and psychiatric 
conditions (Moore, Schneider, Schwingenschuh, Moretto, Bhatia & Haggard 2010/3; 
Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod & Franck 2003; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck & Lindner 2010; Voss, Moore, Hauser, Gallinat, Heinz & Haggard 2010), but 
very little research has been conducted on the effects of pharmacological manipulations 
(Moore et al. 2010/3; Moore, Turner, Corlett, Arana, Morgan, Absalom, Adapa, de Wit, 
Everitt, Gardner, Pigott, Haggard & Fletcher 2011), and no information at all is available on 
the effect of alcohol.  Interestingly, facilitation of IB has been observed after administration 
of drugs that increase dopaminergic transmission, such as L-DOPA and dopamine receptor 
agonists (Moore et al. 2010/3).  Given that a great deal of attention has been placed on the 
ability of alcohol to indirectly increase dopamine levels in terminal regions of the 
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mesostriatal system (Morikawa & Morrisett 2010), we hypothesize that alcohol might affect 
IB in the same manner of dopaminergic medications. 
In the present study, we report on the effect of moderate to low doses of ethanol on 
healthy social drinkers, using a standard IB paradigm.  The doses of ethanol used here 
produced blood alcohol concentration (BAC) within the legal limits for driving in most 
European and North-American countries (0.05 to 0.08 g/dl), corresponding to breath alcohol 
concentrations (BrAC) of 0.25-0.35 mg/l. 
 
Methods and Materials 
Participants 
Fifty-nine healthy social drinkers (30 females and 29 males) participated in this study, 
receiving one of the following doses of ethanol: 0.0 (N=19), 0.4 (N=20), or 0.6 (N=20) g/kg.  
Sample size was estimated on the basis on previous studies (see Supplementary Information).  
Demographic characteristics are illustrated in Table 1.  Exclusion criteria included: i) allergic 
reactions to alcohol; ii) alcohol flush reaction, iii) diabetes, iv) psychotropic medications, v) 
medications that might interact with alcohol, vi) self-reported pregnancy, possible pregnancy, 
and breastfeeding.  Inclusion criteria included a weekly alcohol consumption of at least 4-5 
UK units (1 unit = 8 g of ethanol) and a body mass index (BMI) between 18 and 30 (which 
was verified before testing). 
The participants were recruited via advertisements and posters within the University 
of Sussex.  The study was described in detail to each participant before written informed 
consent was obtained.  Procedures and methods were in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki and were approved by the University of Sussex C-REC.  All participants received a 
modest monetary compensation for their participation in the study.  
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Procedures 
The participants were instructed to follow the pretest requirements before testing (see 
Supplementary Information).  At their arrival at the testing facilities, the participants’ BrAC 
was measured using a breathalyser (Lion Alcolmeter SD-400, Lion Laboratories Ltd, Barry, 
UK) to ensure a value of 0.0 mg/l at baseline (T0). 
Experiment 1.  Thirty participants (mean age = 21.53, SD=1.94), received one of the 
following doses of ethanol: 0.0 (N=10, 5 females), 0.4 (N=10, 5 females), or 0.6 (N=10, 5 
females) g/kg.  Testing took place after 11:30 am, starting with a training phase during which 
the participants practiced the IB task. 
Administration of ethanol followed previously described procedures (Loeber & Duka 
2009b).  Both doses were diluted in a flavoured solution to a total of 300 ml (see 
Supplementary Information), which was then divided into six drinks of 50 ml each.  The 
drinks were consumed at the rate of one every 2 min.  Ten minutes after the last drink (T1), 
BrAC was recorded again.  The testing session started 30 min after the first drink and lasted 
25-32 min.  After completion of the task, BrAC was recorded for the third time (T2).  
Experiment 2.  The results of Experiment 1 indicated that low to moderate doses of 
alcohol may affect IB.  The main goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the finding of 
Experiment 1 using a slightly different alcohol administration procedure.  Since the IB 
paradigm has been linked to the SoA and because the SoA has been hypothesized to be 
related to affect (Takahata, Takahashi, Maeda, Umeda, Suhara, Mimura & Kato 2012; Yoshie 
& Haggard 2013, 2017; Christensen, Yoshie, Di Costa & Haggard 2016), and impulsivity 
(Moore et al. 2010/3), we also collected measures of subjective affective state and action 
inhibition using the Stop Signal Task (SST) (Logan 1994), for an initial test of these 
hypotheses.  Detailed information concerning the procedures for the SST, questionnaires, and 
scales is reported in the Supplementary Information section. 
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Twenty-nine participants (mean age = 22, SD=1.98), received one of the following 
doses of ethanol: 0.0 (N=9, 5 females), 0.4 (N=10, 5 females), or 0.6 (N=10, 5 females) g/kg.  
In this experiment instead of adjusting for body weight by keeping the volume of drinks 
constant and changing alcohol concentration (as in Experiment 1), we kept the concentrations 
constant (10.6% and 15.8% v/v, respectively, for the doses of 0.4 g/kg dose and 0.6 g/kg) and 
changed the volume of drinks accordingly (see Supplementary Information). 
In Experiment 2, the participants attended two different sessions.  During the pre-
session the participants used a PC to complete the following questionnaires: i) Alcohol Use 
Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT, Saunders, Aasland, Babor, de la Fuente & Grant 1993); 
ii) Drug Use Questionnaire (Townshend & Duka 2005), iii) Positive and Negative Affective 
Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark & Tellegen 1988); iv), Barrat Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11, 
Patton & Stanford 1995). 
The testing sessions took place 3-8 days after the pre-session, after 11:30 am.  At 
baseline (T0), pre-test (T1), and post-SST (T3), the participants completed the following 
computerised scales concerning their affective state: (i) Affective GRID (Russell, Anna & 
Mendelsohn 1989), a graphic two-dimensional single-item scale, with arousal on the vertical 
axis and pleasure, on the horizontal axis, both dimensions ranging from 1 (lowest) to 9 
(highest); (ii) Biphasic Alcohol Effects Scale (BAES) (Martin, Earleywine, Musty, Perrine & 
Swift 1993), designed to measure both the stimulant and the sedative effects of alcohol 
(associated to the rising and declining limbs, respectively, of the BrAC curve), including 
seven items for each dimension ranging from 1 to 10.  At T3, the participants also completed 
VASs (Visual Analogue Scales) probing the subjective perception of being under the 
influence of alcohol. 
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All other procedures (including debriefing) were identical to those of Experiment 1, 
except that, after the recording of BrAC post-IB (T2), the participants performed the SST, at 
the end of which (T3) BrAC was measured again. 
 
Intentional Binding (IB) Task 
The IB task instantiated an independently published protocol (Haggard et al. 2002).  The 
participants were asked to sit in front of a computer screen (Figure 1a) where a red dot 
appeared at a pseudo-randomised position at each trial and rotated around a clock face at a 
constant rate of 2560 ms per revolution (Libet et al. 1983).  The clock face was marked with 
conventional 5-min interval ticks.  A fixation cross was displayed at the center of the clock.  
The task consisted of four distinct blocks of 30 trials each. 
During two of these blocks (baseline conditions, Figures 1b and 1c), the participant 
either performed a voluntary action or perceived an auditory tone, respectively, then 
estimated the timing of these two physical events.  During the other two blocks (agency 
conditions, Figures 1d and 1e), the two physical events were predictably coupled to each 
other: i.e. a voluntary action was always followed by the sensorial outcome after a fixed 
period of 250 ms.  The blocks were separated by a 30-s resting period.  The trial time limit 
for the blocks involving voluntary action was fixed at a maximum of six full revolutions of 
the dot on the clock’s face (15360 ms).  Each trial was initiated when the participant decided 
to press the key.  They were instructed to not use the ticks on the clock face as external cues 
to perform the action, but instead to press the key whenever they felt the urge to do so, and to 
use the clock only as an external metric to gauge the onset of their subjective experience.  
The participants were encouraged to be as precise as possible in judging the timing of the 
events.  Additional information about the IB task is provided in the Supplementary 
Information section.  
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Data Analysis 
Demographic data were analysed using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The 
frequency of drug use was analysed using the Fisher’s Exact test. 
The BrAC data were analysed separately for the two experiments using two-way 
ANOVAs on between-subject factor alcohol (0.0, 0.4, and 0.6 g/kg) and within-subject factor 
time (T0, T1, and T2 for Experiment 1; T0, T1, T2, and T3 for Experiment 2), followed by 
appropriate post-hoc pair-wise comparisons. 
Intentional Binding data were obtained as described in previous studies (Moore et al. 
2010/3, 2011; Haggard et al. 2002; Christensen et al. 2016; Lush, Parkinson & Dienes 2016).  
First, we calculated distinct values for the action shift and the tone shift.  The former was 
obtained by subtracting the estimated time of voluntary action in the Baseline condition from 
that of the Action Agency condition.  Similarly, the tone shift was calculated by subtracting 
the estimated time of tone perception in the Baseline condition from that of the Tone Agency 
condition.  We then calculated IB by subtracting the action shift from the tone shift.  This 
measure is thought to provide an implicit, quantitative measure of the SoA.  The action shift, 
tone shift and IB data were analysed in two ways.  First, we used a planned one-tailed One 
Sample t-test (as the direction of the effect was predicted) to verify the occurrence of IB in 
each of the three groups.  Second, group differences were assessed with a two-way ANOVAs 
on between-subject factors experiment (experiment 1 and experiment 2) and alcohol (0.0, 0.4, 
and 0.6 g/kg), followed by appropriate post-hoc pair-wise comparisons. 
Detailed information concerning the analysis of SST, questionnaires, and scales data 
is reported in the Supplementary Information section.  A summary of the main results is 
provided in Table 2. 
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Effect size was estimated by calculating partial eta-squared (𝜂2), with critical values: 
0.01-0.059=small effect size, 0.06-0.13=medium effect size, and >0.14=large effect size 
(Cohen 1988). 
 
Results 
Demographics characteristics 
The demographics of the participants are summarized in Table 1.  There were no significative 
between-group differences in age, BMI, and use of alcohol, cigarettes, cannabis, or other 
recreational drugs. 
  
BrAC 
As shown in Figure 2, alcohol increased BrAC levels to same extent in Experiment 1 (F[4, 
54]=82.62, p<0.001, 𝜂2=0.860) and Experiment 2 (F[6,78]=54.209, p<0.001, 𝜂2=0.870).  The 
increase was greater after administration of 0.6 mg/kg than after 0.4 mg/kg at T1, T2, and T3 
(all p’s<0.05). 
 
Intentional Binding task 
As expected, in all groups manifested a significant (p’s≤0.004) shift in estimating the time of 
voluntary action, relative to the actual physical event, and a significant (p’s≤0.004) IB effect 
(see Figures 3, 4a, and 4c, and Supplementary Information, Table S1).  In contrast, there was 
a much greater shift in estimating the time of tone perception after administration of alcohol 
than after vehicle (Figures 3 and 4b), leading to a compression in the estimated delay between 
action and tone perception (Figure 3).  As a result, overall IB was much greater under the 
influence of the alcohol than in controls (Figure 4c).  The ANOVAs, indicated a main effect 
of alcohol for IB (F[2,53]=0.649, p=0.003, 𝜂2=0.194) and tone shift (F[2,53]=0.647, p=0.003, 
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𝜂2=0.196) but not for action shift (p=0.97).  As shown in the insets of Figure 3, the results 
were almost identical in the two experiments, with no effect of experiment and no alcohol x 
experiment interaction for action shift, tone shift, or IB (p’s>0.25).  Post-hoc LSD tests 
showed significant differences in IB between the vehicle group and both alcohol groups 
(p=0.004 and p=0.002 for the 0.4 g/kg and 0.6 g/kg group, respectively; p<0.05 and p<0.01, 
respectively, after Bonferroni’s correction), which did not differ from each other (p=0.82).  
Also for tone shift there were significant differences between the vehicle group and both 
alcohol groups (p=0.003 and p=0.002 for the 0.4 g/kg and 0.6 g/kg group, respectively; 
p<0.01 for both groups after Bonferroni’s correction), which did not differ from each other 
(p=0.9).  Additional information about the IB task is reported in the Supplementary 
Information section (Tables S1 and S2). 
 
Measures of impulsivity and affect 
Detailed information concerning the results of the SST, questionnaires, and scales is reported 
in the Supplementary Information section.  A summary of the main results is provided in 
Table 2.  As shown in Table S3 (Supplementary Information section), there was no 
significant correlation between the effects of alcohol on IB and those on SSRT, arousal, 
pleasure, on stimulation/sedation.   
 
Discussion 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effects of alcohol on  
Intentional Binding (IB).  We found that at low to moderate doses (0.4-0.6 g/kg) of ethanol, 
producing BrAC within the driving limits of most European and North American countries 
(0.25-0.35 mg/l), alcohol enhanced IB, indicating a tighter linkage between voluntary action 
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and external sensory events.  These same doses of alcohol did not affect impulsivity, as 
indicated by the SST, nor the affective state of participants.   
 
Effects of alcohol on IB 
The mechanisms responsible for the effect of alcohol on IB are not obvious, as this drug has a 
variety of actions in addition to its well know allosteric agonism at GABA-A receptors 
(Stephens, King, Lambert, Belelli & Duka 2017).  Previous studies suggest the possible 
involvement of at least two of these mechanisms.  The first one is represented by the ability 
of alcohol to increase dopamine levels in the terminal regions of the mesostriatal dopamine 
system by inhibiting (via GABA-A receptors) GABAergic interneurons projecting onto 
dopaminergic neurons, effectively disinhibiting the latter (Morikawa & Morrisett 2010).  
Indeed, enhanced IB occurs in individuals with Parkinson’s Disease (PD) treated with L-
DOPA and/or dopamine D2 receptor agonists (Moore et al. 2010/3).  The second potential 
mechanism is represented by allosteric antagonism at ionotropic glutamatergic receptors 
(Möykkynen & Korpi 2012).  Increased IB has been, in fact, observed in healthy individuals 
treated with the non-competitive NMDA antagonist ketamine (Moore et al. 2011).  
Interestingly, in addition to its action on NMDA receptors, ketamine has also direct agonist 
effects on dopamine D2 receptors (Kapur & Seeman 2002). 
However, it is important to point out that the effects of ketamine and dopaminergic 
medications on IB are not identical.  Ketamine increases the binding of the action towards the 
tone (Moore et al. 2011) whereas L-DOPA and dopaminergic agonists increase the binding of 
the tone towards the action (Moore et al. 2010/3).  The dissociation in judgment shift for 
action versus tone (see Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner & Rowe 2013) point to distinct mechanisms 
of action for the two classes of drug.  The effects of alcohol reported here are similar to those 
of dopaminergic medications, consistent with our working hypothesis. 
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It is not clear how increased dopaminergic transmission strengthens IB relative to 
placebo.  It is unlikely that this effect depended on the transient slowing on a hypothetical 
internal clock after the voluntary action (Moore & Obhi 2012), because drugs that increase 
dopaminergic transmission, such as amphetamine and cocaine actually speed up the clock 
(Badiani & Stewart 1999; Cheng, Ali & Meck 2007).  Alternatively, it has been suggested, 
building on the role of dopamine in prediction error learning (Schultz 1998), that the 
“exaggerated action–effect binding” of dopaminergic medications may be “caused by 
modulation of phasic dopamine prediction error signals” (Moore et al. 2010/3).  Lastly, since 
dopamine has been implicated in the attribution of incentive salience (Berridge & Robinson 
1998), it is possible that dopaminergic hyperactivity increases the incentive-salience of the 
tone in relation to the voluntary action, thus ‘attracting’ the former towards the latter. 
A potential limitation of the present study is intrinsic to the IB task.  Previous studies 
show stronger binding between voluntary actions and outcomes than between pairs of sensory 
stimuli (Haggard et al. 2003; see also Buehner 2012; Suzuki et al. 2019). Thus, we focused 
here on the effects of alcohol on a task that can reflect sense of agency, as previously done in 
studies with dopaminergic medications (Moore et al. 2010/3).  Further research is necessary 
to determine whether dopaminergic agonists and alcohol would facilitate also the binding of 
sensory events in the absence of voluntary action. 
 It has been hypothesized that the facilitation of IB in individuals with PD treated with 
dopaminergic medications might be related to impulsivity (Moore et al. 2010/3), which is 
thought to depend on dopaminergic transmission (Jentsch, Ashenhurst, Cervantes, Groman, 
James & Pennington 2014).  The fact that impulse control disorders (e.g. pathological 
gambling, hypersexuality, compulsive shopping and eating) often develops in PD patients 
receiving dopaminergic medications, especially dopamine agonists, is a convincing rationale 
for this interpretation (Voon, Hassan, Zurowski, de Souza, Thomsen, Fox, Lang & Miyasaki 
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2006; Dagher & Robbins 2009).  However, the results presented here suggest that 
abnormalities in IB might develop independently of impulsivity, as we found no correlation 
between the effects of alcohol on IB and performance on the SSRT (see Supplementary 
Information section, Table S3).  Although the sample size in Experiment 2 was relatively 
small, these findings are also consistent with the results of a previous study with 0.4 g/kg 
ethanol (Caswell et al. 2013) and findings of an additional smaller study with 0.6 g/kg 
ethanol (unpublished data).  Both indicate that alcohol had no significant effect on the 
performance in a visual SST.  Nevertheless, others have observed that the same doses of 
alcohol can produce impaired inhibitory control in the SST (Mulvihill, Skilling & Vogel-
Sprott 1997; de Wit, Crean & Richards 2000).  It is possible that these inconsistent effects of 
alcohol on inhibitory control might reflect different alcohol administration procedures 
resulting in different absorption rates. 
 Previous studies exploring the emotional modulation of IB in healthy volunteers 
focused on assessing the valence of the outcome, showing that binding is reduced when one’s 
voluntary actions cause negative outcomes, compared to positive or neutral outcomes 
(Takahata et al. 2012; Yoshie & Haggard 2013, 2017; Christensen et al. 2016).  Indeed, low 
to moderate doses of ethanol typically increase positive emotions and prosocial behaviours, 
which is thought to represent a motivating factor for alcohol consumption among non-
dependent individuals (Kamboj et al. 2013; Müller & Schumann 2011), whereas at higher 
doses ethanol can produce aversive effects, including dysphoria and aggression (Ito, Miller & 
Pollock 1996).  However, our results show that at doses that altered IB, alcohol had no 
significant effects on the affective state of participants (see Table 2 and Table S3 in 
Supplementary Information).  These findings deserve particular attention, especially in the 
context of future neuropharmacological investigations of IB under the effect of alcohol, as 
discussed in the following section. 
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Alcohol, IB, and Legal Responsibility 
The major aim of our study was to fill a gap in our understanding of the effects of moderate 
doses of alcohol.  However, it is not inappropriate to observe that, to the extent that IB 
reflects the SoA, our study might have significant implications for important aspects of 
human social behaviour that are underpinned by the SoA.  In law, for example, criminal 
responsibility requires not only that an agent perform a specific motor action (actus reus) but 
also that the agent “knows the nature and quality of the act” (mens rea) (Child, Child & 
Ormerod 2015), with obvious implications for liability and sentencing in cases of 
intoxication.  Indeed, alcohol intoxication, by altering partially or totally the capacity of a 
person to form means rea, is a commonly invoked defence in alcohol-related accidents or 
crimes (Dimock 2011; Husak 2012; Law & Sociology 2018).  Quite surprisingly, we found 
here that at concentrations within legal limits for driving (that is, in the absence of overt 
intoxication usually associated to impulsive and aggressive behaviour) alcohol does not 
decrease but facilitates IB.  This finding challenges simplified notion of alcohol intoxication, 
suggesting that the degree of intoxication matters not only quantitatively but also 
qualitatively. 
 
Intentional Binding as an index of SoA 
While IB is sensitive to experiences of agency (Lush et al. 2017), temporal binding also 
occurs between events believed to be causally related (Buehner & Humphries 2009; Buehner 
2012) and the magnitude of IB can be the same for both intentional and causal binding when 
conditions are well matched (Suzuki, Lush, Seth & Roseboom 2019).  It has recently been 
claimed that IB is unrelated to action intention, because binding is driven by the relative 
precision of action and outcome cues (Kirsch, Kunde & Herbort, 2019).  However, because 
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motor intentions are likely to influence the variability of action timing judgements, and 
therefore the extent of binding (Lush, Roseboom, Scott, Seth, Cleermans & Dienes 2019), IB 
is perhaps best understood as causal binding arising from intentional action.  To the extent 
that motor intentions support the SoA, changes in IB may to reflect changes in the availability 
of motor intentions to higher order processes, including both the generation of SoA and the 
timing of sensory events. 
Finally, although we agree with Moore and Obhi (2012) that “whilst it is yet to be 
fully explicated, the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency is compelling”, 
it is fair to note that our study presents two limitations.  First, in the absence of a control task, 
we cannot rule out the possibility that binding here is attributable to differences in causal 
beliefs.  However, we have no theoretical reason to anticipate alcohol-related influences on 
beliefs about causation.  Hence, such a chain of phenomena is not required for a 
parsimonious interpretation of our results.  Second, although the IB task represents an 
indirect, albeit objective, measure of SoA, it does not necessarily index the higher-level 
explicit experience of agency.  Thus, it would be important to verify whether the effect of 
alcohol on an implicit measure of SoA extends to explicit (metacognitive) measures (Ebert & 
Wegner 2010). 
 
Conclusions 
On the assumption that changes in IB reflect SoA here, our study suggests important 
implications which could be explored in future work.  First, it might help update the 
conceptualization of addiction and other impulse control disorders as disorders of ‘free-will’ 
(Heyman 2013).  Second, although there is no agreement on whether “the sense of agency is 
either necessary or sufficient for consciousness of the kind that the law takes to be involved 
in voluntary action” (Maoz & Yaffe 2016), our study might have some bearing on forensic 
17 
 
aspects of substance use (Yoshie & Haggard 2013; Haggard 2017).  Thus, further 
investigation of the influence of alcohol and other addictive substances on the SoA may 
foster the refinement of neuroscientific models of motivation and volitional self-control, and 
provide a more useful framework for both therapeutic and legal applications (Pierre 2014). 
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Table 1. Demographics, BrAC, and drug use. Values are expressed as means (SD) or 
percentage of use. 
 
Variable Ethanol dose (g/kg) Group Comparisons 
 
0.0 
N=19 
0.4 
N=20 
0.6 
N=20 
 
Age 
21.58 
(1.98) 
21.65 
(1.79) 
22.05 
(2.16) 
F(2,56)=0.32, p=0.73 
Gender 9M, 10F 10M, 10F 10M, 10F  
BMI 
23.55 
(3.21) 
23.24 
(2.09) 
22.79 
(2.35) 
F(2,56)=0.42, p=0.66 
Alcohol intake 
(units per week) 
8.26 
(6.05) 
11.7 
(7.18) 
8.60 
(7.18) 
F(2,56)=1.51, p=0.23 
Number of 
cigarettes per 
day(a) 
1.42 
(3.42) 
1.00 
(2.10) 
0.23 
(0.57) 
F(2,56)=1.34,p=0.27 
Recreational 
Cannabis use(b) 
48% 35% 55% 
p=0.80 
(two-tailed Fisher Exact 
Probability test) 
Other recreational 
drugs(c) 
21% 20% 20% 
p=0.99 
(two-tailed Fisher Exact 
Probability test) 
 
Abbreviations: BMI, body mass index; BrAC, breath alcohol concentration. 
(a) Cigarettes: All smokers smoked <11 cigarettes a day. 
(b) Cannabis: Participants reported a temporal pattern ranging from ‘weekly’ to ‘less than once a month’. 
(c) Other recreational drugs: Participants reported a frequency of use of ‘less than once a month’ 
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Table 2. Questionnaires, scales, and SST.  (A) Barrat Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11), Positive 
and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS), and Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test 
(AUDIT) collected during the pre-session; (B) Stop Signal task (SST); (C) Affective Scales 
at T0 (baseline), T1 (pre-test) and T3 (post-test); (D) Visual Analogue Scales (VASs) at T3.  
Values indicates mean±SEM. See text and Supplementary Information for details.  
 
 Vehicle 
Ethanol 
0.4g/kg 
Ethanol 
0.6 g/kg 
F p 𝜂2 
A) Pre-session scales       
BIS - 11 65.78±4.06 58.10±3.20 67.50±3.60 1.97 0.16 0.13 
PANAS Positive 32.89±2.50 37.20±1.72 30.20±1.82 3.20 0.057 0.20 
PANAS Negative 18.67±1.89 19.90±1.59 17.20±0.80 0.88 0.43 0.06 
AUDIT 8.67±1.80 8.80±1.02 6.10±0.63 1.61 0.22 0.11 
B) SST       
Go accuracy % 97.41±1.03 96.66±1.11 96.67±1.03 0.17 0.84 0.01 
Go reaction time (ms) 457.61±28.25 506.42±43.63 491.96±31.77 0.48 0.63 0.04 
Stop accuracy % 49.4±2.27 52.5±2.14 52±1.07 0.67 0.55 0.05 
SSRT (ms)  226.9±11.39 239.05±12.66 246.46±15.29 0.62 0.546 0.04 
Mean SOA stop 230.69±36.30 267.38±42.68 245.50±27.72 0.26 0.78 0.02 
C) Affective Scales       
Affective Grid Ar Pl Ar Pl Ar Pl Ar Pl Ar Pl Ar Pl 
 T0 
4.89 
±0.75 
6.67 
±0.75 
4.70 
±0.62 
7.20 
±0.42 
4.60 
±0.54 
6.40 
±0.64 
0.87 0.21 0.49 0.93 0.06 0.02 
 T1 
6.22 
±0.60 
7.22 
±0.46 
6.40 
±0.72 
8.10 
±0.31 
5.40 
±0.67 
6.90 
±0.55 
      
 T3 
4.33 
±0.97 
6.44 
±.58 
4.90 
±0.77 
6.90 
±0.31 
5.15 
±0.48 
6.40 
±0.27 
      
BAES Stim Sed Stim Sed Stim Sed Stim Sed Stim Sed Stim Sed 
 T0 
31.67 
±5.21 
19.56 
±5.19 
38.90 
±3.34 
14.40 
±2.92 
27.70 
±3.96 
22.30 
±3.80 
0.78 0.12 0.54 0.98 0.06 0.01 
 T1 
36.22 
±3.66 
16.33 
±4.48 
47.60 
±3.80 
10.90 
±2.79 
39.50 
±4.21 
21.00 
±4.96 
      
 T3 
26.11 
±5.56 
26.22 
±6.10 
30.80 
±4.72 
17.80 
±4.47 
27.50 
±2.74 
27.60 
±5.66 
      
D) post-test VASs       
“Feeling the effect of alcohol” 1.67±0.44 4.40±0.62 4.90±0.64 8.61 0.001 0.40 
“Feeling high” 1.89±0.81  3.60±0.76 5.20±0.73 4.60 0.02 0.26 
“Liking the effect” 2.78±0.88 5.00±0.70 5.00±0.52 3.22 0.056 0.20 
“Wanting more drink” 1.44±0.67 4.00±0.82 3.70±0.96 2.71 0.08 0.17 
“Liking the taste of the drink” 4.33±0.78 5.10±0.82 4.30±0.92 0.29 0.75 0.02 
Abbreviations: SSRT (Stop Signal Reaction Time), SOA (stimulus onset asynchronies). BAES (Biphasic Alcohol 
Effects Scale), Stim (Stimulant), Sed (Sedative), Ar (Arousal), Pl (Pleasure).  
26 
 
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic representation of the Intentional Binding Task.  Participants were 
seated in front of a computer screen where a red dot was rotating around a clock’s face at the 
constant speed of 2560 ms (a).  The task included two Baseline and two Agency blocks.  In 
the Baseline-Action block (b) participants make a voluntary action (key press) at the time of 
their own free choice and then estimated the point on the clock when they made that action.  
In the Baseline-Tone (c) an outcome (tone) was delivered at a random time and participants 
estimated the perception of that event.  In the Agency conditions, voluntary actions were 
always followed by an outcome (a tone) after a constant delay of 250 ms (d, e).  In the 
Agency-Action block (d) participants estimated the time at which they made the voluntary 
action whereas in the Agency-Tone (e) block they estimated the time at which they heard the 
tone. 
 
Figure 2.  Mean (±SEM) BrAC following ethanol administration in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 at T1, T2, and T3 (only for Experiment 2) for the participants who received 0.4 
g/kg or 0.6 g/kg ethanol (see text for details).  Asterisks indicate a difference at p<0.05 (*) 
and p<0.001 (****) relative to T0. 
 
Figure 3.  Schematic representation of the timing of actual events for the three groups.  When 
voluntary actions and the sensory events are coupled, humans tend to judge the action as 
occurring later in time (action shift, indicated by the blue dotted arrow) and the sensory event 
as occurring earlier in time (tone shift, indicated by the red dotted arrow), relative to when the 
events occur separately.  This results in a compression of the estimated delay (green arrow), 
that is, in the ‘binding’ of the two processes.  See text and Supplementary Information for 
details. 
 
Figure 4.  Summary of the results from the Intentional Binding task. (a) Action shift in 
estimating the time of voluntary action, relative to the actual phyisical event, in all groups.  
(b) In contrast, there was a much greater shift in estimating the time of tone leading to a 
compression in the estimated delay between action and tone perception in the alcohol groups 
comapred to placebo (sign-reversed for illustration purpose).  As a result, the overall IB (c) 
was much greater under the influence of the alcohol than in controls.  Data are presented as 
Mean (±SEM).  Asterisks indicate a difference at p<0.005 (**) relative to vehicle group (0.0 
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mg/kg).  The insets show the results for the two experiments separately, with no effect of 
experiment and no alcohol x experiment interaction for action shift, tone shift, or IB 
(p’s>0.25).   
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
  
Et-OH 0.0 g/kg 
Et-OH 0.4 g/kg 
Et-OH 0.6 g/kg 
Physical events 
Action Tone 
Time (ms)  
0 100 300 50 200 250 -50 150 
0 100 300 50 200 250 -50 150 
Judgment of events 
baseline agency agency baseline 
0 100 300 50 200 250 -50 150 
agency baseline agency baseline 
Time (ms)  
0 100 300 50 200 250 -50 150 
agency baseline agency baseline 
action shift 
tone shift 
31 
 
Figure 4 
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